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this paper, we firstly presented a summary of the different generations of these models in connection with
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discuss the predictability of possible currency crises in Turkey by using the leading economic indicators
approach.
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THE PREDICTABILITY OF CURRENCY CRISES: THE CASE OF TURKEY
1. Introduction
Financial crises, in general, may be attributed to the need for sudden and sharp changes
in prices and/or quantities in financial markets for bonds, equities and foreign
exchanges. The delay in the adjustment process increases the sharpness of the change,
and hence, the degree of the crisis. In that respect, a currency crisis may be expected to
occur when a speculative attack on a specific currency results in a devaluation (or a
sharp depreciation) or forces the authorities to defend the exchange rate by depleting
large volumes of international reserves or by sharply raising interest rates.
In the last decade of the 20
th century, several crises in financial and foreign exchange
markets in Europe (1992-93), Latin America (Mexico, 1994-95) and Southeast Asia
(1997-98) led economists to focus on the causes and timing of these crises. They tried to
explain different experiences of countries with different economic structures and
historical backgrounds by using different models, since there is no unique reason of
crises. Traditional models regarding the balance of payments and currency crisis in the
late 1970s and the first half of the 1980s suggest that the determinants of crises can be
explained by looking at economic fundamentals, while more recent models link
currency crises to self-fulfilling behaviors or contagion effects with moral hazard
problem and herding behavior. Recent literature also concentrates on the determination
of the indicators and the predictability of currency crises by developing statistical
methods like leading economic indicators or early warning systems (e. g. Kaminsky et
al. 1998).2
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we shortly summarize the theoretical
background of the crisis models in the literature. In Section 3, we analyze the origins of




4 and Southeast Asian countries (1997-98)
5 in order to
investigate the suitability of theoretical crisis models and to show whether there is any
common cause of these crises. In Section 4, we summarize the empirical literature on
the predictability of currency crises and then, examine the predictability of potential
crises for the case of Turkey using the leading economic indicator methodology which
was first proposed by Burns and Mitchell (1946). And finally, in Section 5, we present
some concluding remarks.
                                                
2 Eichengreen et al. (1994) deal with the ERM crisis in Europe in 1992.
3 Ertugrul and Zaim (1996), Ozatay (1996) and Celasun (1998) focus on the 1994 financial crisis in
Turkey.
4 The Mexican peso crisis is analyzed mainly by Lustig (1995), Calvo and Mendoza (1996), Edwards
(1996), Sachs et al. (1996) and Gil-Diaz (1998).
5 Krugman (1997), Moreno et al. (1998) and Corsetti et al. (1998a and 1998b) try to illuminate the
theoretical origins and (international) effects of the Asian crisis in 1997-98.3
2. Theoretical Models
The theoretical models on currency crises can be classified into two generations.
 6 The
first-generation models (Krugman 1979, and Flood and Garber 1984) accounted well
for many of the currency crises in the 1970s and also for the 1982 developing-country
debt crisis, but they failed to explain crises such as in Chile (1982), Europe (1992-93),
Mexico (1994-95) and Asia (1997-98). Second-generation models (Obstfeld 1994)
differ from the former ones since they are multiple-equilibria models. They consider an
interaction between private sector and government behavior that gives rise to several
possible solutions, i.e. the economy's equilibrium can jump from one solution to
another.
2.1. First-Generation Models
In his seminal paper, Krugman (1979) stressed the role of the weak fundamentals as a
triggering factor of currency crises. He assumed that the government budget deficits
were at the root of speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates.
These models argue that the currency crises are preceded by the macroeconomic
imbalances in the economy that are inconsistent with the maintenance of fixed exchange
rates. According to Krugman (1979), under a fixed exchange rate regime, monetization
of fiscal deficits, which creates domestic inflation, leads to an appreciation in the real
exchange rate. The deteriorating effect of increasing domestic prices on the current
account balance causes a gradual loss of reserves and ultimately, leads to a speculative4
attack against the currency. When the authorities are no longer able to defend the
pegged exchange rate, they are forced to abandon the parity. The foresighted speculators
would reallocate their portfolios by selling domestic currency for foreign currency
before the exhaustion of reserves since they notice that the price of foreign exchange
would begin rising. By doing so, they accelerate the period that ends with the
abandonment of the fixed exchange rate. In that respect, these models combine a linear
behavior rule by the private sector (the money demand function) with linear government
behavior (domestic credit growth).
2.2. Second-Generation Models
The second-generation crisis models do not reject the role of the fundamentals in the
economy. However, financial crises are not always necessarily determined by the weak
fundamentals. That means that not all speculative attacks may be warranted by the
weaknesses of fundamentals.
The second-generation models (Obstfeld, 1984, 1986, 1994) consider nonlinear
behavior rules by one or more agents. Therefore, these nonlinearities can lead to
multiple solutions. For example, a multiple equilibria exists in the foreign exchange
market because of the contingent nature of the policy makers' and governments'
objective function. According to these models, maintenance of the pegged exchange
rates depends on the government's decision. The authorities might abandon a peg, if it
were concerned that economic policies necessary to maintain the exchange rate might
have adverse effects on other macroeconomic variables. In this context, these models
                                                                                                                                              
6  For theoretical models see Agenor et al. (1992), Kaminsky et al. (1998), Kruger et al. (1998) and5
stress the trade-offs between the benefits of a credible exchange rate peg and the costs
in terms of higher interest rates, higher unemployment or lower growth of defending
peg (Reisen 1998).
The recent studies of Paul  Krugman (1998) and others in the aftermath of the structural
financial crisis in Asia can be viewed as “third generation” of currency crisis models.
These new models consider some disputed issues such as (1) moral hazard or
asymmetric information problem that lead to an underpricing of the risks associated
with investing in emerging markets, (2) herding behavior of bankers and portfolio
managers and (3) international contagion effects appearing by some transmission
channels such as trade and financial linkages between countries.
3. Country Experiences
In this section, we briefly survey selected four financial crises in the 1990s in order to
demonstrate both the similarities and differences between the causes and consequences
of the crises. This will help us in determining the indicators of currency crises, and
hence, in constructing and implementing the leading economic indicator method for
Turkey in the sixth section of our study.
3.1. The European Exchange-Rate-Mechanism Crises of 1992-93
In Fall 1992, foreign exchange markets in Europe were experienced a succession of
crises. The dynamics of the exchange-rate-mechanism (ERM) crises were different from
those of the crises explained by the first generation models since it could not be
                                                                                                                                              
Flood et al.(1998).6
explained by weak fundamentals. For ERM crisis period, Eichengreen et al. (1994)
found evidence against the fundamentals-based models of speculative attacks. In the
ERM countries, governments had no need to monetize their budget deficits, and they
were not suffering from any limitation on foreign exchange reserves. They had low and
stable inflation rates both before and after the crisis. So, what caused the ERM crises?
According to the ERM of the European Monetary System, all participating countries
pegged their currencies to the German Mark in a narrow range. In the aftermath of the
fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany in October 1990, capital inflows
were directed to the country because of the new opportunities for investors. On the other
hand, the reunification of Germany caused heavy expenditures. This expansionary fiscal
policy increased aggregate demand. National production expanded rapidly in 1990 and
1991. However, the economy began to overheat as demand exceeded production
capabilities, so that inflation rate increased. In order to slow down inflation, the German
Bundesbank conducted tight monetary policy and interest rates rose.
The capital inflows together with tight monetary policy of the Bundesbank led to the
appreciation of German Mark against the US dollar. In order to maintain fixed exchange
rates, other European countries pegging their currencies to the German Mark found
themselves forced to match the tight monetary policy without fiscal expansion. This
caused a slow down in economic growth and created unemployment. Many speculators,
especially George Soros, foresaw that members of the ERM would devalue their
currencies. At the final stage, the ongoing process led some countries to exit from the
ERM. Britain left the ERM by devaluing pound by about 25 percent. Then, Spain and
Italy devalued their currencies. These devaluations had spillover effects on some other7
EU countries like Republic of Ireland and Portugal due to the trade links (Eichengreen
et al. 1996).
In the light of these events, the case of the ERM crisis can be explained by the second-
generation models, since the government had multiple objectives some of which are
conflicting with the fixed exchange rate target. In the countries concerned, the decision
to abandon the pegged exchange rate system seems related to the cost of defending a
peg by raising interest rates. Rising interest rates might worsen the unemployment
problem. Therefore, the authorities were less willing to defend their currencies.  In that
respect, it seems that the decision to leave the ERM was to some extent an optimizing
decision in terms of the second-generation models.
3.2. The Mexican Peso Crisis (1994-95)
During the period of 1987-93, Mexico successfully pursued major structural reforms.
They were designed to liberalize foreign trade, reduce the public sector’s role in the
economy and eliminate the macroeconomic imbalances. Mexico’s 18 commercial banks
and many important public enterprises were privatized. A major tax reform was
realized. Credit controls were removed and interest rates were determined freely.
These policies led to an economic recovery. Inflation was brought down from around
160 % at the end of 1987 to under 10 % in 1993. Primary fiscal deficit of 6 % of GDP
was shifted to a surplus exceeding 7 % of GDP. These achievements coupled with the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) led to substantial capital inflows into8
the country.  The Mexican peso was overvalued and the country had a very large current
account deficit.
7
Although the structural reforms were successful in bringing down the inflation, the use
of the nominal exchange rate-based stabilization measures resulted in a real appreciation
of the peso. The fact lying behind this appreciation was the differential between the
domestic and foreign inflation rates. The actual inflation rate was still above the target
level. On the other hand, there was a huge capital inflow to the country because of the
economic recovery and the fall of the interest rates in the US. These factors also caused
the currency overvaluation by attracting the foreign capital. The real appreciation of the
currency resulted in a growing disequilibrium in the current account balance in Mexico.
However, it did not seem unsustainable to the government, because they thought that
this growing deficit was temporary. Furthermore, it was financed by massive capital
inflows.
Rising interest rates in the US and the assassination of presidential candidate Donaldo
Colosio (in March 1994) had an undesirable impact on the Mexican economy. In the
aftermath of this assassination, the risk premium demanded by foreign investors
increased, the capital outflows began and the first sharp fall in reserves occurred. The
Mexican government issued more tesobonos
8 in order to attract investors by covering
them against the risk of devaluation.
                                                
7 According to Sachs et al. (1996), the widening current account deficit was the result of excess
investment over savings.
8 Tesobonos are short-term dollar-denominated government debt.9
However, the huge change in the amount of tesobonos was a signal for many investors
for the unsustainability of the existing exchange rate policy. This time, the Mexican
monetary authorities decided to sterilize the fall in reserves by expanding domestic
credit. This led to a fall in the interest rates while the interest rates in the US were high.
The expansion of domestic credit increased the pressures on the peso. Because of these
factors the Mexican economy became more vulnerable. The first devaluation was
announced on December 20, investors panicked and ran from the Mexican peso. On
December 22, the authorities switched their exchange rate policy to the floating one.
The devaluation was resulted in a financial crisis with significant spillover effects on
other countries in Latin America.
In the light of these events we can say that self-fulfilling expectations arising from the
misperceptions about the development of economic fundamentals or political
uncertainties were at the root of the Mexican peso crisis. The spillover effect of this
crisis might be interpreted as a reflection of investor pessimism. Investors who believed
that other emerging market economies might experience similar difficulties ran on other
currencies even though fundamentals were unchanged. In their paper, Calvo et al.
(1996) explain that countries with weak fundamentals were affected more from the self-
fulfilling investor panic than those with strong fundamentals.
3. 1994 Financial Crisis in Turkey
Turkey experienced a severe currency crisis in early 1994. This crisis was different from
those in European countries, Mexico and Southeast Asian Countries due to the fact that
the exchange rate system was a managed float rather than being fixed.10
In the first half of the 1990s, there were imbalances in the macro economic variables
such as increasing and high public sector deficits, inadequate private savings to finance
these deficits and as a result of these two deficits growing external deficit. This
disequilibrium and the efforts to sustain it by inappropriate policies had some
reflections to the relative prices. Some developments precipitating the crisis were
observed in the foreign exchange markets.
After the financial liberalization in 1989, Turkey had attracted capital inflows due to
high real interest rates. This led to an overvaluation of the Turkish Lira (TL). The
appreciation of the currency and also the tariff reductions in 1989 caused current
account deficits. The pressures on the exchange rate and the interest rates, and the open
position of the banking system, which was around 5 billion dollars, increased the
demand for dollars.
There was a run from the TL. The banks rushed to foreign exchange market to close
their foreign exchange position. The Central Bank intervened the foreign exchange
market in order to defend the exchange rate. As a result the Central Bank lost half of its
reserves and overnight interest rates reached a record level. The open position of
commercial banks declined to 1,1 billion dollars in June 1994.  Finally, these
developments had an impact on the parity. It was about 15000 TL/US$ in January 1994,
but jumped to 38000 TL/US$ by the first days of April 1994.
In the first quarter of 1994, the Turkish lira (TL) depreciated by more than 50 percent
against the US dollar, real output contracted by about 6 percent, annual inflation rate
jumped to three digit levels (see Table 1). At the end of 1993, public sector debt stock
and deficits as a percentage of GDP reached record high levels and the burden of11
interest payments increased. The government attempted not to impede growth prior to
the local election of the governments in March 1994 and it made an attempt to control
the interest rates.
9 So, there was a policy shift from bond-finance to money-finance
starting from the last months of 1993. Several Treasury bill auctions were cancelled and
the Treasury started to rely on short-term advances from the Central Bank. Therefore,
there was a substantial real increase in Central Bank's domestic credits starting from the
beginning of  September 1993. The real return on Treasury bills turned to negative at
the end of 1993. The cancellation of auctions increased the uncertainty in the financial
markets and shook the confidence of investors. Finally the Treasury lost its ability to
borrow.
Özatay (1996) argues that the 1994 currency crisis of Turkey started due to public debt
mismanagement. At a time of large and rising PSBR and declining maturity of debt
stock, interventions to decrease the interest rate and cancellations of auctions was a poor
idea (Celasun 1998).
                                                
9 Ozatay (1996) and Celasun (1998) argue that instead of trying to correct the fundamental imbalances,
which cause interest rates to be so high, to control the interest rate was a policy error.12
Table 1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators of Turkey (in percent, 1987-1997)
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
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￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿$￿ !￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ !￿￿￿ ￿￿% !￿￿￿ !￿￿￿ %￿￿ !￿￿￿ !￿￿￿ !￿￿￿
"&￿￿￿’￿ ￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿￿ ()*+ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ (￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿&￿￿ ,"&￿￿￿’￿- . ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿ %￿￿%￿ %￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿￿
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￿￿3￿￿￿ 4￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿5￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿$￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿3￿￿￿ /￿￿￿￿’￿ ￿￿3￿ 4￿￿￿1 * ￿$￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿% %￿￿￿
￿￿3￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿3￿ 4￿￿￿1 * ￿$￿ %￿￿￿ %%￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ %￿￿￿
/￿￿￿￿’￿ 67￿ ￿￿’￿ ￿￿8￿￿￿￿￿ * 9%: ￿￿￿￿ %%￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿%￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
/￿￿￿￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,$￿￿-. ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿%% ￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿% ￿￿￿
/￿￿￿￿’￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿&￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,$￿￿- . %￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿%￿ %￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ %￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
;￿ ￿￿ 4 ￿￿￿!(￿￿￿ ￿￿8￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ,$￿￿- . ￿￿ !%%￿￿ !￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ !￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ !￿￿%￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Source: Undersecretariat of Treasury, Ankara.
* In million US$.
The 1994 crisis was not an unexpected event due to the fact that many economic
indicators were giving warning signals. The fundamental fiscal variables were
deteriorated, public sector deficit was financed by domestic credit expansion and the
demand for foreign currency was increased. There was a great loss of reserves. With
these characteristics, it can be said that the Turkish currency crisis fits in the first-
generation models (Celasun 1998). On the other hand, the 1994 currency crisis had
some features of the second-generation models. Because of the forthcoming elections,
the government was reluctant to increase the interest rates in order to avoid the
devaluation of the TL. In that respect, the 1994 currency crisis of Turkey might be
explained by the second-generation models because of the government's objective
function.
3.4. Asian Crisis of 1997-98
The Asian crisis does not fit into the Krugman’s model since it was neither driven by
huge fiscal deficits nor by excessive domestic credit expansion. Actually, before the
crisis, most of the economic indicators were quite strong.13
The inflation rate was relatively moderate in the affected countries like Thailand,
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines. Fiscal indicators were sound. They had
high growth rates and did not suffer from substantial unemployment. However, there
were few macroeconomic variables vulnerable such as high and growing current
account deficits, especially in Malaysia and Thailand.
The main factors underlying the large current account deficits were as follows: (1) The
devaluation of Chinese currency in 1994 which had a negative impact on the
competitiveness of region countries. (2) The appreciation of dollar after mid 1995 which
led to the appreciation of the currencies of the region currencies pegged to the dollar.
10
(3) In 1996 a sharp decline in the demand for semi-conductors had an adverse effect on
export growth of region economies. (4) The long period of stagnation in Japan led to
significant decrease in the growth rate of exports of the region countries.
11
Financial liberalization in many Asian countries in 1990s in conjunction with the strong
macroeconomic fundamentals attracted investors looking for higher returns and caused
a very rapid growth of net capital inflows into these countries. The growing current
account deficit was financed by this large amount of foreign capital inflow. On the other
hand, huge capital flows (mainly through international lending of banks) into the region
countries caused an expansion of aggregate demand and considerable increase in stock
and real estate prices.
                                                
10 By July 1997, the region currencies were mainly pegged to the US dollar.
11 Japan was the second important export market for the region countries with a share of 30 percent14
The region countries were developed without having a well-functioning and robust
financial system. The weaknesses in the financial system led to serious adverse
selection and risky lending.
12 A large share of their lending were used in markets for
real estate which incurred a “bubble” element. As much of the capital inflows were
short term, the banks were borrowing from international markets in short term and
lending in domestic markets in long term (Asian Development Bank 1998). There was a
mismatch in the maturities of banks' assets and liabilities.
Relying on the government's guarantee both depositors and lenders (international and
domestic banks) led to moral hazard problem. As lenders have less information than
borrowers there was an asymmetric information between the market participants and
hence, a moral hazard problem on the investors’ parts (see Asian Development Outlook
1998). Depositors had no incentive to monitor the soundness of the banks because of the
implicit or explicit deposit insurance. The lack of monitoring created moral hazard for
bank managers. Another type of moral hazard problem occurred on the part of financial
institutions, which had undertook high-risk lending activities by ignoring the costs of
these investment projects. Financial institutions did not hedge their funds to currency
and interest rate movements. On the contrary, they believed the future bailout and took
even more risk. Large amount of borrowing from abroad to finance rapid expansion
made companies highly leveraged.
All these complicated structural and economic factors made region countries quite
vulnerable to financial crises and led to markets’ concern about the prevailing exchange
                                                
12 However, they were hidden by rapid growth, high savings and strong fiscal positions.15
rates. The real estate and stock prices fell and the companies went bankrupt. Rapid
capital outflows led to investors panic. As a result, in July 1997, Thailand abandoned
the fixed rate of the Baht (local currency) against the US dollar by causing consecutive
devaluations in some other regional countries having similar structural weaknesses.
The Asian crisis invoked further theoretical and empirical research on causes, timing
and effects of currency crises worldwide. It is neither fully completed in affected Asian
countries nor prevented from spilling over to countries like Russia and Brazil.
Therefore, it is difficult to evaluate the relevance of this new generation models entirely,
presented by Krugman (1998) and others.
4. The Empirical Literature
Currency crises that occurred and is still affecting in various developing and developed
countries led to a great deal of empirical research in this area. Their main aim is to find
“early warning signals” for the crises, however the predictability of the crises is still
under discussion. Although most of the time the results vary across countries, it has
almost been common experience to work with a group of crisis indicators.
Before 1990s, empirical studies on currency crises were mainly focused on standard
first generation models, which  were thought to have significant prediction power. The
underlying reason of speculative attacks was fiscal deficits financed by domestic credit
creation (Flood and Marion 1998) as mentioned above. Empirical work using structural
models focused on a particular country in a specific time period, so the results were far
from being general. Some examples to such models are Blanco and Garber (1986)
which used a version of Krugman-Flood-Garber model to predict the timing of16
devaluations realized as a result of speculative attacks on Mexican peso. They
calculated the probability of pursuing rates exceeding the fixed rate in the next quarter.
The non-structural models used in late 1980s confirmed the role of traditional factors in
predicting crisis. Edwards (1989) examined the behavior of various indicators before the
devaluations and compared their patterns with those of the control group that pursued
fixed exchange rate regime during the working period. Klein and Marion (1994)
performed a panel data analysis for devaluation periods in Latin American countries.
They calculated the monthly probability of abandoning a pegged exchange rate
increased with real overvaluation and declined with the level of foreign assets.
Frankel and Rose (1996) identified currency crises as substantial nominal currency
devaluation. As pointed out this criterion would exclude instances where a currency
came under severe pressure but the authorities successfully defended it by intervening
heavily in the foreign exchange market, or by raising interest rates sharply, or by other
means. Alternatively, an index of speculative pressure that takes into account not only
the changes in exchange rate, but also movements in international reserves or interest
rates that absorb pressure and moderate the exchange rate changes. This definition
includes both significant currency depreciations and the actions by the authorities
averted a large devaluation or the abandonment of an exchange rate peg.
Most crises that occurred in 1990s did not support the idea that fiscal and monetary
deterioration precedes the crisis. This caused researchers to work with a wide variety of
indicators. In most of the empirical studies aiming to predict the currency crises non-
parametric tests based on the observation of the behavior of the individual series for the
periods prior to crises and tranquility were employed. To our knowledge, most17
comprehensive study on empirical survey of currency crises is Kaminsky, Lizondo and
Reinhart  (1998) (KLR).  They had employed the so-called “signal approach” based on
monitoring the behavior of a number of indicators to observe the warning signals about
the potential currency crises. They found exports, real exchange rate, international
reserves, output, domestic credit, inflation, fiscal deficit and equity prices as useful
indicators in predicting currency crises for a sample of 15 developing and 5 industrial
countries during 1970-1995 .
Uçer, Rijkeghem and Yolalan (1998) (URY), using the same methodology for Turkey,
had found that the ratio of short- term foreign debt to GNP, the ratio of exports to
imports, the ratio of short-term advances to Treasury over GNP and the ratio of M2Y
plus government domestic debt to GNP have strong predictive power for the 1994 crisis
in Turkey rather than the indicators which take place in the study of KLR.
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994) applied an empirical analysis based on
monitoring the behavior of macroeconomic variables for 22 countries (mostly OECD
countries) for the period of 1967-1992. They found significant differences among the
behavior of some variables like budget deficits, inflation, export/import ratios between
the periods of speculative pressures and tranquility for the non-ERM sub-sample.
However, they did not find any noticeable difference for the ERM sub-sample between
periods of speculative attack and tranquility. Moreno (1995)  stressed in his study
covering the economies in the Asia-Pacific Basin that if no difference is found then
episodes of speculative pressure might be the result of arbitrary shifts in expectations.18
5. Data Description and Sources
In this study, we used monthly data for the period of 1986-1998 taken from IMF’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS; CD-ROM version), The Undersecretariat of
Treasury and electronic data distribution system of Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey (CBRT) (http://www.tcmb.gov.tr).
The variables used in our study are as follows (see table 2): Broad-money (M2), M2Y
(M2 plus foreign exchange deposits), domestic credits of deposit banks, nominal
exchange rate (TL/$), gross international reserves, manufacturing industry price index
(1987=100), manufacturing industry production index (1992=100), short-term capital
flows, current account balance, budget balance, wholesale price index (general and sub-
items, State Institute of Statistics (SIS), 1987=100), consumer price index (SIS,
1987=100), deposit money bank credits to private sector, net domestic assets of the
Central Bank, reserve money, interbank overnight interest rates, foreign assets of the
Central Bank, foreign exchange deposits, export and import price indeces, market
determined exchange rates (for the period of 1986-93 from World Currency Yearbook
and for 1994-98 from Daily Newspaper Milliyet) , business survey data (Central Bank
Tendency Surveys). Equity price index was taken from Istanbul Stock Exchange, the
average auction rates from the Undersecretariat of Treasury and exports (line70d),
imports (line 71d), Treasury bill rate of US (line 60c) from IFS CD-ROM version. Since
monthly GNP figures are not available monthly manufacturing industry production
index was multiplied by manufacturing industry price index in order to derive a proxy
of nominal GNP.19
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Following the literature, we define currency crises, as being an abnormal behavior of
the exchange rate market index. The currency crisis index (CCI) was constructed as a
weighted average of monthly exchange rate changes, the negative of monthly
international reserve changes and the difference between the domestic interest rates
(average auction rates of Treasury) and foreign interest rates (Treasury bill rate of US).
The weights are chosen so as to equalize the variance of the three components in order
to avoid any component dominate the index. When the value of this index exceeds the
threshold value
13 (means that when the domestic currency depreciates, international
reserves decline and the interest rate increase), there is an indication of currency crises
(see Graph 1).






























































































































                                                
13 The threshold value is defined, as it is commonly used in literature, 1.5 times the pooled standard
deviation of the calculated index plus the pooled mean.21
6. Leading Economic Indicators Approach: The Case of Turkey
Leading economic indicators (LEI) method is a non-structural time series technique,
which was first proposed by Burns and Mitchell (1946). It is being widely used to
predict the turning points of various economic aggregates, besides econometric and
structural time series models. This approach exploits the phenomenon that the cyclical
movements in some variables systematically pre-date those in the other variables for
sound economic reasons. “Cyclical pattern” is an abstract concept and can not be
observed in any direct way. A time series can be expressed as Y=C+S+T+I, where C is
the cyclical component, S is the seasonal component, T is the trend component, and I is
the irregular component. In order to obtain cyclical component, firstly we deseasonalize
the series having seasonal component by using X11-Census filter founded by the
Bureau of Census of the US Commerce Department. Secondly, for the series having
trend component, detrending was performed by Hodrick-Prescott (=14400; default for
monthly data) filtering which was introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1990). In order
to keep a standard, we detrend and deseasonalize all the series. As a result, we reach
almost the same conclusions.
Defining the cyclical movements in both the “reference series” and the other variables is
the first step in constituting the leading indicators system. “Reference series” is an
economic variable or a composite index of coincident economic variables that the
forecaster wishes to explain its turning points. We considered “foreign exchange market
pressure index” as reference series and tried to find out the indicators signaling the
crises systematically. To forecast the reference series a composite index including the
leading indicators might be used via least square models. After determining the cyclical22
patterns of the series, the relationship between the reference series and the potential
indicators are investigated. Cross-correlogram analysis is the method that compares two
series not only at the turning points but also all through the sample. The cycle of a
leading series exhibit a turning point before that of the reference series. In order to
observe the cycles clearly some analysts prefers smoothing although this method leads
to a loss of information and of possible shifts of the turning points.
Majority of the empirical work deals with multi-country analysis. In this study, like in
few papers we tried to determine the facts that cause or indicate currency crises by using
single country (Turkey) data. To our knowledge, the methodology used here was
distinct from those used up to now.
We compared the behavior of a number of indicators with that of the foreign exchange
market pressure by using the leading economic indicators approach. Among 51
indicators, terms of trade (A20), market determined exchange rate over official
exchange rate (A51) and some of survey data (A37 and A38), listed in Table 3, were
found as leading indicators of the currency crisis index (see Graph 2). Parallel with the
results of Sachs et al. (1996), Kaminsky et al. (1998), Kruger et al. (1998), and Frankel
and Rose (1996) the ratio of budget deficit to GDP and the ratio of current account
balance to GDP were found to be insignificant.
On the other hand, we couldn’t find any relation between the following indicators and
the crisis index: Growth of domestic credits of deposit banks (A2), the ratio of M2 to
gross international reserves (A3), growth of exports (A4), growth of imports (A5), the
ratio of short term capital flows to industrial production (A7) and the ratio of current
account balance to industrial production (A8). By the way, it must be noted that also23
some important vulnerability indicators like the ratio of M2 over gross international
reserves did not produce (A3) a significant relation. Finally, it can be said that relying
solely on these methodologies will not be sufficient to predict the future financial crises,
although following the patterns of critical indicators might help the policy makers for
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Graph 2:  SELECTED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SMOOTHED (SM) CYCLES
(C) OF  CURRENCY CRISIS INDEX AND LEADING INDICATORS
        A20: Terms of Trade   C: Cycle    SM: Smoothed    CCI: Currency Crisis Index
A30: Over the next  three months, opinion about the export possibilities compared to previous month
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7. Concluding Remarks
Since the causes of crises are different for each country, econometric models are always
subject to serious criticisms. Cross-sectional models are also criticized as providing
concurrent information rather than leading.
14 These efforts are found to be helpful in
understanding past crises but they are weak in predicting crises. Although models
relying on time series techniques are also found to be weak in predicting crises, the
leading indicators approach might be useful in constituting an early warning system.
Regarding to our results, however, it can be said that using leading economic indicators
approach in order to predict currency crises in a specific country is not as proper as a
panel-data analysis for multi-country studies.
On the other hand, for crises arising from pure contagion effects or speculative attacks,
early warning systems may not be helpful because they arise from unpredictable market
reactions.
15 For recent crisis experiences in Mexico (1994-95) and Asia (1997-98), it
was difficult to predict crises solely looking at indicators because prior to crisis these
countries had sound macroeconomic fundamentals. However, they had weak financial
system characterized by inadequate supervision and regulation, and they incurred policy
shocks.
The present study could be made more powerful by including indicators related to
political circumstances. However, it is obvious that including such political
circumstances into the models is a difficult attempt. One shortcoming of the LEI
                                                
14 Eichengreen and Rose (1998) and Flood and Marion (1998).
15 IMF Staff (1998).27
method is the systematic relationships’ among the indicators and crises index being very
sensitive to structural breaks, such as policy changes. An indicator exhibiting abnormal
behavior in the pre-crises period is not always a perfect evidence for a crisis. Taking this
fact into account, one has to check the significance relationships between the indicators
frequently.
As a result we may conclude that if the weak fundamentals (first-generation models) are
at the root of the currency crises, it might be possible to predict this type of crises.
However, if the crises occur because of the self-fulfilling attacks (second-generation)
the prediction of this type of crises will be very difficult. Furthermore, one indicator that
gives a signal for one country, might not work for another country.
In the light of the financial crises especially in emerging markets it can be said that it is
necessary to put in place institutions and policies to manage and reduce the
macroeconomic financial risks in countries removed restrictions on capital account
movements (IMF 1998b). These countries should implement appropriate
macroeconomic, exchange rate and financial policies with measures towards building a
more prudent and transparent financial system. Otherwise, it should not be a surprise
that they find themselves in the center of new financial and currency crises.28
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